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Post-Intentional Phenomenology as Ethical and Transformative 
Inquiry and Practice: 
Through Intercultural Phenomenological Dialogue 
by Younkyung Hong 
Abstract 
This study is a conceptual dialogue aimed at attaining insight into reading and developing post-
intentional phenomenology as intercultural philosophical inquiry. This conversation commences with 
the problem of Eurocentric phenomenology and introduces several examples of intercultural pheno-
menological attempts which fail to move beyond the validation of non-European philosophy using 
a Eurocentric viewpoint. The first section of this study introduces possible conditions and approaches 
for intercultural phenomenology, drawing mainly on Kwok-Ying Lau’s (2016) work on phenomenology 
and intercultural understanding, with a view to extending the scope of phenomenological research 
beyond the limitations of a Eurocentric attitude largely influenced by and inherited from Husserl. 
The second section considers ways in which the understanding and approach of post-intentional 
phenomenology could be widened and deepened by the intercultural dimension, and vice versa. 
Building on these discussions, the paper concludes with a brief consideration of the implications 
for phenomenological research and of how an intercultural understanding and approach inform 
research design. Following “lines of flight” in these discussions, post-intentional phenomenology is 
proposed as an ethical and transformative inquiry. 
Introduction 
Post-intentional phenomenology (Vagle, 2014, 2018) 
opens up generative space to explore how a researcher 
is intentionally related to a phenomenon through con-
ceptual dialogues with various philosophies, theories 
and ideas. As post-intentional phenomenology is inspired 
by post-structuralism, it disrupts rigid hierarchies and 
structures which have been constructed as conventions 
in qualitative research. This empowers researchers to 
explore and initiate discussions about phenomena, and 
especially those which have been restricted by research 
traditions and procedures researchers have felt methodo-
logically constrained to follow. 
Despite the generative space that post-intentional pheno-
menology offers, it has been difficult for me personally 
to ignore the manifestation of the Eurocentric history 
and characteristics of phenomenology in general. This 
manifestation had led me to wonder what it means that 
a researcher, whose being is rooted in and predominantly 
influenced by non-European philosophy and culture, 
takes up phenomenology as an approach to explore her 
intentional relationships with the phenomenon. Am I 
perpetuating the positioning of Western/Eurocentric 
research methodologies as benchmarks for understanding 
and validating phenomena, including those oriented to 
and evolving in a non-European lifeworld? Next, I 
confronted the dilemma of my using phenomenological 
Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology       Volume 19, Edition 2        November 2019       Page 2 of 11 
 
 
© The Author(s). This Open Access article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons License [CC BY-NC-ND 4.0]. 
The IPJP is published in association with NISC (Pty) Ltd and Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. 
www.ipjp.org 
research methodology to understand my own being and 
becoming in this world as well as the phenomenon of 
becoming a socially just educator, which involves the 
effort of dismantling the dominant power structures in 
society. This manifestation of conflicts calls for over-
coming the Eurocentric aspects of phenomenology and 
moving on to the intercultural phenomenological dis-
cussion. 
 
Limitation of Eurocentric Phenomenology 
 
My preliminary literature search about issues regarding 
Eurocentric phenomenology shows that the majority of 
these studies are centred on the review and discussion of 
Husserl’s attitude on philosophy, especially his response 
to the crisis of Europe and European humanity. I do not 
intend to limit the scope of this discussion of Eurocentric 
phenomenology by focusing on Husserl; however, in 
light of previous work on this topic, it seems difficult not 
to centre this discussion on Husserl and his Eurocentric 
tendency. Further research is needed on this topic in 
respect of how Husserl’s phenomenological heirs have 
inherited and/or challenged the Eurocentric tendency in 
phenomenology. 
 
It is still vital to start examining Husserl’s Eurocentric 
attitude and how his work and attitude have influenced 
the Eurocentric attitude in phenomenology at large. In  
particular, reviewing Husserl’s Eurocentrism provides 
the opportunity to understand the sociohistorical context 
of Husserl’s work in which his perception of “crisis” 
and his envisioning of the solution to rescue Europe is 
grounded. 
 
Husserl’s Eurocentric Phenomenology 
 
Both Husserl’s egocentric viewpoint and his assertion of 
the Eurocentric civilization of non-European cultures in 
considering ways to overcome the crisis and seek “truth” 
are often represented as his limitation of philosophizing 
humans and phenomena. Due to his strong Eurocentric 
stance, and especially given his position as the founder 
of phenomenology, Husserl’s defininition of philosophy 
and ways of seeking truth have remained an assignment 
for philosophical practitioners who seek intercultural 
phenomenological discussion (Lau, 2016). Besides this, 
Husserl’s assertion of the need for universality in 
phenomenological investigation led phenomenologists 
to inquire into the general attitude in phenomenology. 
Lao (2004) argues that the lack of both Western and 
non-Western phenomenologists’ attention to the non-
European lifeworld continues to exhort Chinese philo-
sophers to regard phenomenology as being a branch of 
European philosophy, which hardly makes sense with 
non-European being and thinking (Lao, 2004). 
 
According to Tava (2016a), Husserl’s stance in respect 
of the Europeanization of all other cultures is based on 
his firm belief and confidence in European culture. Tava 
states that, “For Husserl, European culture is not only 
the highest culture ever achieved in human history, but 
also ‘the first realisation of an absolute norm of develop-
ment, which is called [berufen] to revolutionize every 
other self-developing culture’” (Tava, 2016a, p. 207, 
citing Husserl1). Husserl’s obsession with a universal 
ground for all other cultures can be better explained by 
the social and historical context within which Husserl 
founded phenomenology. When Husserl diagnosed the 
crisis of European humanity and put back together the 
subject-object separated by Descartes, he was concerned 
with the problem of positive science and its tendency 
to understand and view the world from a mathematical 
perspective while avoiding looking at meanings and the 
constitution of phenomena (Simms, 2005). Husserl, in 
contrast, was hopeful of universal and rational science 
– European science before positive science – which 
influenced his conception of the lifeworld as valid and 
universal regardless of cultural differences (Lau, 2016; 
Yu, 2004). 
 
Limitation of Eurocentric Phenomenology 
 
Husserl’s exclusive idea of the world and philosophy 
not only denies the legitimacy of non-Western/non- 
European philosophies, but also fails to acknowledge a 
significant amount of wisdom shared by and inherited 
from Western thinkers as philosophy (Lau, 2016). More 
specifically, “Husserl’s judgement is based on his own 
predetermined idea of philosophy as ‘pure thêoria’, 
which is in turn based on his own understanding of the 
philosophico-scientific attitude of the Greeks as a  ‘purely 
theoretical attitude’” (Lau, 2016, pp. 125-126). This idea 
of philosophy has bolstered the Euro- and egocentric 
response to the problems in Europe which encourages 
humans to control the world with their power and to 
keep their borders safe (Tava, 2016b). Husserl had faith 
in the Europeanization of all other cultures as the best 
solution for fixing problems and conflicts in the world, 
and he was not much concerned about erasing cultural 
heritage from sociopolitical and intellectual diversity 
(Tava, 2016b; Yu, 2004). 
 
Gubser (2013) and Yu (2004) point out that Husserl’s 
idea of Europe is geopolitical, and not philosophical. 
Compared to the philosophical idea of Europe, which 
will be discussed later, the geopolitical idea of Europe 
influences people to be obsessed with a subject-centred 
worldview and exclusive attitude toward others in which 
a culture of dominance and superiority becomes deeply 
entrenched (Gubser, 2013; Tava, 2016b; Yu, 2004). 
Lau (2016) contends that an exclusive attitude toward 
others, such as ethnocentrism, counteracts the finding 
of truth. Other scholars also propose the criticality of 
                                                 
1 Husserl, E. (1989). Fünf Aufsätze über Erneuerung. In T. 
Nenon & H. R. Sepp (Eds.), Aufsätze und Vorträge (1922-
1937). Husserliana, Vol. XXVII, pp. 3–94. Dordrecht, The 
Netherlands: Kluwer.  Author’s translation. 
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recognizing others and understanding “lifeworld” as plural 
(e.g., Gubser, 2013; Ruggenini, 2004; Yu, 2004). For 
example, drawing on the interdependence of humans and 
the world argued by Patočka, Gubser (2013) assesses 
that only recognition of the intersubjective community 
“could render subjective phenomena worldly, and thus 
open a horizon for activity” (p. 163). Ruggenini (2004) 
furthermore points out the danger of Europe’s attitude of 
self-sufficiency, in that defending and locking off them-
selves from others can only cause conflict. At the end 
of his Phenomenology and Intercultural Understanding, 
Lau (2016) reminds us that no culturally discrete part of 
the world can be self-sufficient, since its own cultural 
identity is defined in relation to other cultures in a world 
that has always been shared. This point enlarges the 
possible interpretation of and inquiry into what “finding 
an [European] identity again” (Ruggenini, 2004) means 
and can be. 
 
Several Attempts Toward Establishing Intercultural 
Phenomenology and Their Limitations 
 
Lau (2016) introduces a phenomenological reading of 
Eastern philosophy, such as Daoism based on Laozi’s 
work and Husserl’s stance on Buddhism. For instance, 
Lau (2016) discusses the similarity between the Dao 
as the primordial nature and “the world of wild being” 
addressed by Merleau-Ponty. Laozi and Merleau-Ponty 
both urge cultural renewal in the world of crisis through 
what we can learn from the order of primordial being 
and nature. This reading of Laozi through Merleau-Ponty 
identifies the commonality between one branch of Eastern 
philosophy and a Western thinker who appears to be 
inspired by Husserl. However, without there being any 
work disputing Husserl’s stance on Eastern philosophy, 
it is a logical leap to relate Husserl’s phenomenology 
and Daoism. After introducing a possible phenomeno-
logical reading of Laozi through Merleau-Ponty’s work, 
Lau (2016) expresses doubt “whether Husserl would 
accept to dialogue with a so-called ‘anti-rationalist’ 
Chinese thinker” (p. 52). 
 
It is challenging to start intercultural philosophical 
dialogue, especially with a philosophy denigrated by its 
own founder. Acknowledging this difficulty, I found two 
possible ways to enable this dialogue: one involves the 
restoration of Eastern philosophy through Husserl’s 
approval, drawing on his verbal and textual remarks, 
and the other is by disputing Husserl’s stance on non-
European philosophy and complementing its limitation 
through philosophical dialogue across other phenomeno-
logists’ works. Lau’s (2016) chapter about Husserl and 
his comment on Buddhism introduce the approach closer 
to the first way by focusing on Husserl’s reading and 
appreciation of Buddhism. 
 
According to Lau (2016), Husserl expressed his excite-
ment regarding Buddhism in a short review article in 
1925 after encountering a German translation of Buddhist 
scripts. In this article, Husserl praises the Buddhist attitude 
as a way of transcending worldly life through comparing 
its significance with his transcendental phenomenology 
(Lau, 2016). However, despite his acknowledging of 
Buddhism as a valuable theoretical attitude, Husserl 
did not define Buddhism as a philosophy, given his 
perception of the absence in Buddhism of the “universal 
science of being” (Lau, 2016, p. 61). Thus, Husserl’s 
enthusiasm for Buddhism and his comparison of Buddha 
with Socrates are not sufficient to validate Eastern 
philosophy as fulfilling the requirement of Husserl’s 
transcendental phenomenology (Lau, 2016). 
 
These attempts towards intercultural phenomenology 
through a reading of Daoism and tracing of Husserl’s 
comments on Buddhism show that these approaches 
still uphold Husserl’s idea of philosophy as undisputed. 
Without challenging his idea of philosophy, it would 
be difficult to imagine the capacity of phenomenology 
“with” non-European philosophies and “about” cultures 
other than the European while respecting their intellectual 
and cultural values and specificities. Fortunately, there 
are philosophers who challenge Husserl’s conception of 
philosophy, both directly and indirectly. Especially, 
Kwok-Ying Lau, a philosopher based in Hong Kong, 
has significantly developed intercultural discussion in 
phenomenology through conceptual dialogue across 
various philosophers, cultures, countries, languages and 
eras. While the preceding discussions about readings of 
Laozi and Husserl’s stance on Buddhism are also based 
on Lau’s work, the following sections would not be 
possible without Lau’s intercultural work that introduces 
underrepresented philosophers and re-readings of well-
known philosophers’ work. 
 
Grounding of the Intercultural Phenomenological 
Discussion 
 
Beyond Europe: Jan Patočka 
Jan Patočka is a vital philosopher for intercultural 
phenomenological discussion. Lau (2016) introduces 
him as one of the first philosophers who urged the 
necessity of abandoning the Eurocentric viewpoint and 
approach to the crisis diagnosed by Husserl. Patočka’s 
reflection on the natural world transgresses Husserl’s 
egocentric understanding in that he traces its history 
back to ancient Greece. Patočka characterizes the natural 
world as dynamic and human existence as based on the 
unfathomable order of nature. This approach questions 
the idea of universality and “humans as truth bearing” 
subject asserted by Husserl (Lau, 2016). Lau (2016) 
interprets Patočka’s worldview as acknowledging the 
plurality of lifeworld interculturally and as such inviting 
philosophies from other cultures to better articulate the 
meaning of and ways toward the truth of the world. 
 
Patočka’s phenomenology of the natural world can be 
characterized as dynamic, as he views movement as the 
principle of phenomenality (Lau, 2016). This reflection 
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seems quite distinct from Husserl’s phenomenology of 
the world at large; however, Patočka’s thematization of 
primordial nature inherits Husserl’s view on the Earth, 
that “The original ark, earth, does not move” (Lau, 2016, 
p. 80, citing Husserl2). Human and life in Patočka’s 
phenomenology are represented as the existence of 
movement; meanwhile, this movement is based on the 
Earth, which he understands as “the ultimate referent of 
movement on the other” (Lau, 2016, p. 80). Through 
this thematization of the natural world, the Earth, Patočka 
further articulates how human existence is intentionally 
related to primordial nature and nothingness (Lau, 2016). 
Lau (2016) assesses that Patočka’s point would be better 
articulated and developed with Laozi’s Daodejing, which 
understands the Dao as essentially the “inchoative nature 
of the primordial order” (p. 81). He adds the necessity 
of intercultural dialogue in that, while this way of 
ontological understanding might sound unfamiliar in the 
European philosophical tradition, it is not at all new to 
Eastern philosophy (Lau, 2016). In this respect, Patočka’s 
phenomenology of the natural world and Lau’s (2016) 
interpretation of Patočka’s work contribute to establishing 
the ground for a collective understanding of ontological/ 
existential being-ness in the world. 
 
One might wonder how this approach overcomes Euro-
centrism in phenomenology while Patočka’s work is 
still based on European soil and himself as an heir of 
European spirit. It is important to note that Patočka’s 
view on humanity transgresses Husserl’s scientific 
rationality in that his understanding of human existence 
is grounded on the profound order of the lifeworld, 
which Patočka calls “world mystery” (Lau, 2016). It is 
plausible to argue that the world mystery echoes the Dao 
in Laozi’s Daodejing, as Patočka’s description of the 
world mystery represents its characteristics of not reveal-
ing the surface but rather the principle of all movement. 
Patočka articulates his world mystery as the common 
foundation of a particular community, culture and history, 
and this worldview challenges Husserl’s singular life-
world and notion of diversity to be surpassed through 
transcendental philosophy (Lau, 2016). 
 
Merleau-Ponty’s Interworld and Cultural Flesh 
Lau (2016) develops the notion of cultural flesh inspired 
by Merleau-Ponty’s reflection on flesh: that the culti-
vation of cultural flesh invites us to sense the world 
beyond the partial world which we have encountered 
within the boundary of our own culture. He developed 
this notion by taking up the characteristic of flesh which 
mediates our contact with the world; at the same time, 
                                                 
2  Husserl, E. (1981). Grundlegende Untersuchungen zum 
phänomenologischen Ursprung der Räumlichkeit der Natur 
[Foundational investigations of the phenomenological 
origin of the spatiality of nature] (F. Kersten, Trans.). In 
P. McCormick & F. Elliston (Eds.), Husserl: Shorter works 
(pp. 213–221). Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame 
Press. (Original work published 1934) 
this contact brings the pre-existing world to us. Merleau-
Ponty’s notion of flesh aims to understand the meaning 
of things and the world itself through sensibility (Lau, 
2016). Merleau-Ponty describes flesh as “the coiling 
over the sensible upon the sensing body”, and selfhood 
is born “thanks to the movement of coiling over the 
flesh” (Lau, 2016, p. 185, citing Merleau-Ponty3). Lau 
(2016) credits understanding the flesh for encouraging 
us to dive into deeper understanding of and contact 
with the world, given that this notion restrains us from 
perceiving things as materialistic and banal. 
 
Based on the review and discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s 
notion of the flesh, Lau (2016) elaborates cultural flesh 
as “a state of mind and of carnal dispositions” (p. 190) 
which allows us to “have the sensibility of other 
cultures” (p. 190). As in the role of the flesh, cultural 
flesh leads us to experience and have deeper under-
standing of other people and their cultures. Lau (2016) 
reads cultural differences and borders as a potential of 
intercultural dialogue and also as a vital factor for the 
formation of cultural identity which creates a space to 
realize oneself and truth. Acknowledging the idea of the 
flesh, especially in the context of the heterogeneity of 
the world, Lau (2016) suggests lateral universality – 
cultural and plural universality – which conceptually 
counters Husserl’s Eurocentric universality as another 
ground for intercultural phenomenological dialogue. 
 
Phenomenology Transgressing a Theoretical Attitude 
 
Orientative Philosophy and Rereading of Husserl 
This section discusses philosophy beyond the theoretical 
enterprise centring on Lao Sze-Kwang’s notion of orien-
tative philosophy. Lao Sze-Kwang coined the term 
“orientative philosophy” as a counter term for cognitive 
philosophy to thematize a philosophy which involves 
“self-transformative” and “transformation of the world” 
aspects (Lau, 2016, p. 129). He exemplifies Daoist 
philosophy and Confucian philosophy to explain that 
orientative philosophy asks “Where should we go?” in 
contrast to cognitive philosophy, which asks “What is 
it?” (Lau, 2016, p. 129). Lao emphasizes the ethical 
faculty of orientative philosophy through the example 
of Mencius’s Confucianism, which upholds morality as 
the disposition which distinguishes human beings from 
other animals (Lau, 2016). Mencius considers moral 
faculty as “the special faculty of the human mind” (Lau, 
2016, p.133). 
 
As Lau (2016) starts the discussion of the limitation 
of Husserl’s idea of philosophy, he points out that 
cognitive philosophy fails to provide a deeper under-
standing of human knowledge since it is not situated in 
either a social or a historical context. Then, he introduces 
                                                 
3  Merleau-Ponty, M. (1968). The visible and the invisible 
(A. Lingis, Trans.). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University 
Press. (Original work published 1964) 
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Foucault as a vital philosopher who argues the cruciality 
of including power relations in understanding know-
ledge, as it naturally brings social, historical and political 
considerations into the process. Foucault’s work asserts 
that human beings are morally bound to strive for the 
ethical in their endeavours and practice because human 
beings always exist with others, and this calls for them 
to be moral subjects (Lau, 2016). 
 
Based on this dialogue, Lau (2016) provides a different 
reading of Husserl’s phenomenological attitude, focusing 
on the epoché in that this philosophical inquiry is not 
possible solely through cognitive philosophy without a 
self-transformative endeavour. This rereading contends 
that suspension of preconception – the essential purpose 
of the epoché – for transcending the individual’s 
worldly experience requires self-understanding and self-
transformation through critical reflection on oneself 
(Lau, 2016). Also, he assesses that Husserl ultimately 
aims for a phenomenologist’s vocation to be extended to 
the universal level; he describes it in his The Crisis of 
European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology 
(1936) as “a far-reaching self-transformation of the whole 
praxis of human existence, i.e. the whole of cultural life” 
(as cited in Lau, 2016, p. 149). The next section discusses 
how Patočka’s phenomenology also transgresses “pure 
speculative theoretical thinking” (Lau, 2016, p. 128). 
 
Patočka’s Care for the Soul 
Patočka emphasizes self-transformative and reflective 
practice in seeking truth. His idea of philosophy can be 
represented as a philosophical project of “thinking and 
acting with clarity”, overcoming the obscuring of truth 
due to humans’ precarious status (Lau, 2016). This idea 
is influenced by Husserl and Heidegger’s shared under-
standing of the human being as a being of truth, but 
Patočka develops this idea through a more profound and 
distinctive approach based on a “pre-reflective mythical 
framework” (Lau, 2016). Lau (2016) interprets Patočka’s 
idea of philosophy and his approach as a European 
version of “how a particular cultural ground and mythi-
cal environment was transformed and elevated into a 
universal motivation and movement of human civili-
zation” (p. 96). Patočka legitimizes his statement by 
contending that the ultimate goal in Greek philosophy 
must have been handed down from the mythical 
environment of archaic Greece (Lau, 2016). As it is an 
ontological framework which transcends Ancient Greek 
and European spirituality, Lau (2016) again emphasizes 
Patočka’s “care for the soul”, which is founded on 
profound philosophical and anthropological reflection 
and understanding. 
 
By representing the Mencius theory as a Chinese 
version of how a human civilization understands and 
practises the human being as a being of truth, Lau 
(2016) develops his discussion of Patočka’s world 
mystery. He identifies the celestial order in Mencius’s 
Confucianism as corresponding with Patočka’s world 
history; Mencius addresses the existence of the human 
being rooted in four spiritual dispositions, and two of 
the dispositions, zhi and yi, can be considered Chinese 
versions of truth and justice respectively (Lau, 2016). 
Regarding their concept of philosophy and the way of 
seeking truth, both Mencius and Patočka consider 
philosophy to be not only an ontological project, but 
also a political and social project which involves critical 
reflection and praxis (Lau, 2016; Szakolczai, 1994; Tava, 
2016). Lau (2016) respects both philosophers as those 
who pursue the truth through their ethical practice – 
which transgresses biological life, albeit towards the 
higher order and value of truth and justice. 
 
Patočka’s idea of philosophy and the conceptual dialogue 
initiated by Lau in the matter of overcoming the narrow 
and exclusive idea of philosophy provides indispensable 
ground to direct our questions of what philosophy is; 
more specifically, what is phenomenology, and what 
can be phenomenology? As a researcher, I take up and 
expand this inquiry into how phenomenological research 
can be re-imagined through the intercultural dialogue of 
phenomenology. 
 
Intercultural Post-intentional Phenomenology 
In his discussion of post-intentional phenomenological 
research, Vagle (2018) emphasizes that the prefix “post” 
in post-intentional phenomenology does not denote 
“after” intentionality; instead, as his further articulation 
clarifies, it rather connotes the meaning of “displaying” 
and “pinning/hanging” intentionalities to wait and see 
their movements and actions instead of defining them as 
static and singular in their being. While post-intentional 
phenomenology infuses dynamic movements and capa-
city into its understanding of intentionality, it still draws 
on core concepts and approaches created and developed 
by preceding phenomenologists, such as intentionality, 
bracketing, and reduction. This approach develops these 
core concepts in a critical manner and encourages a 
researcher to commit to the radical and generative space 
produced by the mode of an inquiry influenced by post-
structural ideas, such as the “lines of flight” of Deleuze 
and Guattari4 (Vagle, 2018). 
 
This characteristic of post-intentional phenomenology 
identified by Vagle (2018) kept manifesting during the 
process of reviewing intercultural phenomenological 
approaches which drew mainly on Lau’s (2016) work. 
It was noted that both scholars create new spaces and 
expanding possibilities in phenomenological studies 
through their mode of using of conceptual dialogues. 
Despite quite a few similarities between the scholars’ 
approaches and discussions, there are also aspects that 
appear distinctive in the work of each. Reminding us 
that a characteristic of conceptual dialogue is that it can-
                                                 
4  Deleuze, G. , & Guattari, F. A. (1987). A thousand plateaus: 
Capitalism and schizophrenia (B. Massumi, Trans.). London, 
UK: The Athlone Press. (Original work published 1980) 
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not be unidirectional, the discussion proceeding below 
not only proposes how the intercultural discussion can 
be used in post-intentional phenomenology, but also 
points to how provocation occurs in the intercultural 
dialogue. 
 
When Post-Intentional Phenomenology Meets Inter-
cultural Phenomenology 
Vagle (2018) identifies what most distinguishes post-
intentional phenomenology from the phenomenology 
of Husserl and Heidegger as “through-ness”, which 
connotes post-intentional phenomenology’s generative 
and dynamic capacity and potential. He further asserts 
that this through-ness of post-intentional phenomenology 
leads us to view intentionality as both plural and always 
moving. Vagle (2018) identifies this characteristic of 
post-intentional phenomenology as an ontological project, 
but the natural world including the profound ground 
of every order and all existence is not much discussed. 
Also, while post-intentional phenomenology adopts a 
radical and critical stance in its approach to pheno-
menological research, it has not developed much as an 
intercultural and/or decolonizing research methodology 
oriented towards challenging traditionally Western – or, 
more specifically, Eurocentric – perspectives and forms 
of knowledge production. 
 
As introduced earlier, Patočka’s phenomenology of the 
natural world and movement of existence is a crucial 
foundation for intercultural phenomenology, given its 
opposing of Husserl’s Eurocentrism and supplementing 
of the idea of the natural world which was not fully 
articulated in the phenomenology of Husserl and his 
successors. For this reason, it is suggested that post-
intentional phenomenology take up Patočka’s idea of 
primordial nature as the abyssal and unfathomable order 
of the world as its ontological ground. This ontological 
understanding allows post-intentional phenomenological 
inquiry to be grounded on a common foundation for 
intercultural dialogue with philosophies from different 
cultures and countries. Furthermore, this ontological 
understanding is indispensable to Patočka’s notion of 
“world mystery,” which Lau (2016) considers a vital 
ground for intercultural phenomenological discussion. 
Concurrently, the understanding of intentionality in post-
intentional phenomenology provokes other attributes of 
the natural world and of the inquiry based on the natural 
world, such as non-linear and inconsistent movements 
of intentionality, which include partial, fleeting, gene-
rative, and undoing activities. This way of understanding 
would embrace possible conflicts and contradictions 
which are likely to occur in intercultural discussion; Lau 
(2016) also addresses its messiness and the complexity 
of intercultural work in his discussion of cultural flesh. 
 
Post-intentional phenomenology inspired by Deleuze 
and Guattari’s post-structural idea frees contemporary 
phenomenologists from pressure to follow conventional 
hierarchies and procedures, such as defining what “is” 
and “can be” philosophy when conducting conceptual 
dialogue (Vagle, 2018). Instead, it desires to observe 
generative possibilities and accomplishments imagined 
through the conceptual dialogue, which outcomes would 
not be possible with a single philosophy, theory or idea 
or within the boundary of certain philosophies, theories 
or ideas. In other words, the conceptual dialogue through 
the understanding of the natural world and the post-
structural idea would infuse extra movements and depth 
into phenomenological understanding and encourage 
phenomenologists to pay careful attention to the diverse 
features of manifestations in this radical form of dialogue. 
For instance, Patočka’s reflection of the intersubjective 
constitution of the world and hence his emphasis that 
“only the primordial recognition of intersubjectivity” 
could grant us “access to the wider world as trans-
subjective horizon” (p. 163) would push the bounds 
of post-intentional phenomenology even further by 
posing questions and inspiring pondering on how and 
what this reflection ultimately provokes and becomes 
in phenomenological research. 
 
Another distinctive feature in post-intentional pheno-
menology is its emphasis on individuals and phenomena 
as social beings. Its interests and views on intentional 
relations differ from those of Husserl’s transcendental 
phenomenology in that it understands a phenomenon 
as always in intentional relations with larger social 
dimensions, such as its history and tradition. Contrary 
to a-historical and a-social understandings of phenomena, 
it provides a crucial ontological and epistemological 
perspective to advance intercultural understanding and 
development of phenomenology; this enables us to 
understand a phenomenon from a viewpoint which 
considers an individual as playing either a subject or 
an object role or even both roles (drawing on the idea 
that the line between subject and object is blurred in 
post-intentional phenomenology) in their experience 
of a phenomenon. It draws phenomenologists toward 
contemplating intentionality in an existential sense 
which acknowledges the multifarious possibilities of 
relationships and manifestations rooted in different 
civilizations, values and practices. Moreover, this view-
point counters Husserl’s proposal of the universality of 
all cultures through the Eurocentric idea of scientific 
rationalism, which accompanies surpassing and erasing 
other forms of relations with the world in other cultures. 
Based on this concept of phenomenon and human 
existence, I propose the need to expand phenomeno-
logical research to view the human being as a moral 
subject, which Foucault addresses in his reflection on 
knowledge, and which constitutes both Patočka’s and 
Mencius’s understanding of human dispositions – in  
addition, more specifically, to human dispositions as 
beings of justice. 
 
Lau (2016) introduces the idea of the human being as 
a moral subject with Foucault’s work, through which 
he addresses the importance of including power relations 
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in understanding knowledge. According to Foucault, 
the fact that human beings always exist with others 
unavoidably involves human beings in power relations, 
locating each of them as a moral subject (Lau, 2016, 
citing Foucault5). This conception of individual and 
phenomenon not only brings social, historical and 
political dimensions to our phenomenological under-
standing of the world, but also draws our attention as 
phenomenologists to human existence in relation to its 
moral disposition and ethical practice. The foundation 
in which we can ground this understanding of human 
existence effectively enables twofold consideration in 
post-phenomenological research: on the one hand, it 
allows us to dispute the exclusive idea of philosophy as 
a purely cognitive enterprise; on the other, we can widen 
the capacity and possibility of philosophical research 
beyond mere theoretical contemplation, for example by 
positing praxis as a vital philosophical endeavour. 
 
Post-intentional phenomenology adopts a critical stance 
towards using the term “consciousness”, which is a core 
concept in Husserl’s phenomenology (Vagle, 2018). 
Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of “lines of flight” 
connotes the possibility of intentional movements beyond 
human consciousness and control (Vagle, 2018), and so 
post-intentional phenomenology’s drawing on this idea 
embraces the limitation of human consciousness and 
control in relation to phenomena. Acknowledging that 
egocentrism pulls us back from disrupting egocentric 
boundaries and limiting the possibilities of a generative 
inquiry, Patočka’s critique of Husserl’s description of 
the world as horizon supports Vagle’s (2018) endeavour 
of distancing phenomenologists from an egocentric call 
and tendency. Patočka interprets Husserl’s description 
of the world as that which reduces intentionality to 
“mere” intentionality which is both anticipatable and 
limited within the capacity of human consciousness. 
Lau (2016) develops this analysis further, pointing to 
Husserl’s understanding of the world as the basis of 
his belief in a “single life world”. While Patočka 
recognizes Husserl’s struggle in respect of thematizing 
particularity in each culture and history, he proposes 
the lifeworld as plural, based on the world mystery, so 
that any one in isolation can never be the lifeworld (Lau, 
2016). 
 
In this respect, Patočka’s understanding both buttresses 
a non-egocentric approach to post-intentional pheno-
menology by pointing out the pitfall of the egocentric 
worldview, and paves the way to acknowledging and 
further articulating the plurality of lifeworld. We can 
furthermore argue that it directly challenges the ego-
centric tendency prevalent in academia and also raises 
our awareness of egocentric calls which reduce humans 
to beings that control the world with their power. Based 
on this dialogue, I propose that post-intentional pheno-
                                                 
5 Foucault, M. (1978). The history of sexuality (R. Hurley , 
Trans.). New York, NY: Pantheon Books. 
menology pay explicit attention to the plurality of the 
lifeworld and take this approach as a political inquiry 
disrupting a Eurocentric and exclusive attitude in human 
research. 
 
The last point to be discussed in this subsection is post-
intentional phenomenology’s interest in the work which 
is produced when we try not to “reconcile the edges and 
margins of the theories” (Vagle, 2018). I interpret this 
point as implying acceptance of conflicting and contra-
dictory aspects in conceptual dialogue and take these 
edges and margins as space for unrestricted questioning 
and pondering to flourish, rather than avoiding these 
risks or forcing harmonization among different philo-
sophies, theories and ideas. This attitude resonates with 
the attitude which Lau (2016) cherishes throughout 
the intercultural phenomenological discussion, in that it 
is of the essence not to subsume cultural diversity to 
universality of the kind Husserl envisions as the Euro-
peanization of all other cultures. This radical demand of 
post-intentional phenomenology widens the intercultural 
phenomenological inquiry, and vice versa. 
 
We can either develop this intercultural conversation 
further or, alternatively, take a radical turn through/in the 
post-intentional phenomenological space which invites 
us to be inspired, to be open, and to re-imagine all kinds 
of possibilities. Simultaneously, appreciating the cultural 
diversity addressed in the intercultural consideration 
calls for post-intentional phenomenologists to pay close 
attention to different possibilities and forms of inten-
tionality and manifestations based on a profound under-
standing of life and human existence. Furthermore, this 
requires critical reflection on theoretical frameworks 
which influence a researcher’s phenomenological work; 
there is always the possibility that philosophies/theories/ 
ideas which ground a framework have in fact legitimized 
exclusive and discriminatory ideas about others as well 
as inherited oppressive power structures. 
 
What Does It Mean to Understand Intentionality in a 
Post- and Intercultural Manner? 
Vagle (2018) states definitively that “the practice of a 
post-intentional philosophy is to remain open, flexible, 
and contemplative in our thinking, acting and decision 
making” (pp. 135-136), the implication of which is that 
this research methodology encourages a phenomenologist 
to distance her/himself from dichotomous thinking and 
practice. Drawing on some ideas introduced in Lau’s 
(2016) discussion, I read this statement further to imply 
that self-reflective and transformative practice is based 
on understanding oneself as a moral subject and hence 
understanding philosophical activity as transgressing a 
purely cognitive endeavour. In the rereading of Husserl’s 
notion of epoché, Lau (2016) interprets the epoché as a 
process that requires self-understanding and ongoing 
self-transformation in order to return to encounter the 
world itself. In similar vein, I read the “open, flexible, 
and contemplative” (p. 136) attitude which Vagle (2018) 
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advocates as a self-reflective and self-transformative 
practice, as one has to understand what aspects of one’s 
being and biases distance oneself from achieving and/ 
or maintaining the desired attitude. Also, one has to 
strive to transform oneself based on this understanding 
in order to come closer to the attitude required. 
 
Vagle (2018) defines intentionality as “those in-between 
spaces where individuals find-themselves-intentionally-
in relations with others in the world” (p. 127). In post-
intentional phenomenology, these in-between spaces are 
full of “fleeing, eluding, flowing, and leaking move-
ments” of intentionalities, as Vagle (2018) animates the 
trait of intentionality from a post-structural perspective. 
Despite this understanding of intentionality in the post-
intentional phenomenological approach being already 
complex and dynamic, the intercultural consideration 
further complicates and adds additional dimensions to 
this process. This allows us to consider the process of 
understanding intentionality in intercultural and post-
intentional phenomenology as the continued process of 
self-understanding, critical reflection, self-responsibility, 
caring for others, and commitment, which all calls for a 
courageous attitude and decisions. In this regard, I argue 
that the intercultural discussion solidifies post-intentional 
phenomenology as a philosophy for social change. 
 
Vagle (2018) responds to the critique of phenomenology 
as marked by a “total lack of any political philosophy” 
(p. 131) by saying that phenomenologists have in fact 
been doing the political work in their ontological and 
epistemological work. Regarding the “on the ground” 
level of political work, Vagle (2018) suggests that the 
theoretical conversations of phenomenology be joined 
with other theories. Lau’s (2016) intercultural phenome-
nological discussion exemplifies theoretical dialogue, 
while he advances the conversation mostly at the onto-
logical and epistemological level. Intercultural post-
intentional phenomenology is already a political philo-
sophy without a conversation with politically-oriented 
theories and ideas, even though further conceptual dia-
logue is still worthwhile. 
 
On the one hand, this approach not only questions and 
challenges phenomenology’s most fundamental belief 
and understanding of the world, but also requires self-
reflective and self-transformative practice and decision. 
This process does not stay on the ontological and episte-
mological level of contemplation, but rather it requires 
tenacious body and mind practices, which the notion 
of orientative philosophy implies. On the other hand, 
understanding intentionalities following the “lines of 
flight” and ethical commitment transverses hierarchies 
and procedures in conventional philosophies and research 
methodologies which tend to be stable and conformative. 
A phenomenologist who takes up this approach is 
encouraged to take the risk of fewer/unpredictable out-
comes and also to bear the tensions and conflict s/he 
is likely to encounter. Vagle (2018) reminds us that 
understanding intentionality through post-intentional 
phenomenology is difficult in terms of resisting the force 
trying to pull us back to linear, clearer and dichotomous 
thinking. Besides, both Mencius’s Confucianism and 
Patočka’s life-long endeavour of his brave philosophical 
practice have us keep in mind that one should put one’s 
theoretical and cognitive enlightenment into action, and 
this is not an easy road mentally, nor even physically 
(Lau, 2016). 
 
Implications for Research Design and Process 
 
In this paper, I have continued a conceptual dialogue 
with the hope of gaining insight into reading and deve-
loping post-intentional phenomenology as intercultural 
philosophical inquiry. The conversation started with the 
review and discussion of intercultural phenomenology 
based on the understanding that mere comparison of 
non-European philosophy with European philosophy 
and identification of what they have in common hardly 
overcome the Eurocentric disposition and its role as a 
philosophical benchmark of validity. The review and 
discussion of intercultural phenomenology developed by 
Lau (2016) imply that the intercultural understanding 
of phenomenology calls for a renewal of ontological and 
epistemological viewpoints in phenomenology. Based 
on the different possibilities projected in the discussion, 
I proposed ways in which post-intentional phenomeno-
logy and intercultural phenomenology could become 
within the generative in-between space enabled by the 
conceptual dialogue between the two. Regarding the 
(tentative) outcomes of this process, the fact that the 
ideas of the world and intentionality in post-intentional 
phenomenology are not the same anymore requires that 
researchers take up post-intentional phenomenology 
differently in terms of their research design and imple-
mentation processes. In this respect, I propose how an 
intercultural post-intentional phenomenological study 
could look by adopting Vagle’s (2018) approach as the 
ground for this discussion. 
 
Vagle (2018) provides guidelines for designing and 
implementing post-intentional phenomenological research 
in accordance with his “five-component approach”. The 
five components are as follows: (1) Identify a post-
intentional phenomenon in context(s), around a social 
issue; (2) Devise a clear and yet flexible process for 
gathering phenomenological material appropriate for 
the phenomenon under investigation; (3) Make a post-
reflection plan; (4) Explore the post-intentional pheno-
menon using theory, phenomenological material, and 
“post-reflexions”; and (5) Craft a text that engages both 
the production and provocation of the post-intentional 
phenomenon in context(s) around social issues (see 
Vagle, 2018, pp. 139-161). With an intercultural under-
standing of phenomenology, a phenomenological study 
should be designed on a ground which acknowledges 
the plurality of lifeworld and the idea of philosophy as 
an on-going project of both self-transformation and 
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responsibility for others which involves both body and 
mind. This means that each of the components needs to 
be re-imagined and re-articulated, given that the extra 
dimensions and movements that intercultural pheno-
menology implants complicate the approach as well as 
provoke unprecedented questions and considerations in 
post-intentional phenomenology itself. 
 
The self-reflexive process is already a core part of 
post-intentional phenomenology. However, intercultural 
phenomenology posits that self-reflexion is not only a 
cognitive enterprise, but also an ethical and political 
practice, since it involves self-transformation and care 
for others. In this regard, post-reflexion and its role in 
phenomenological research need to be revised as a space 
for self-understanding and reflection on the decisions 
and actions one has implemented. Beyond this level, it 
should also include reflection on responsibility and the 
act of caring for other people. 
 
Building on the post-reflexion suggestion in Vagle’s 
(2018) approach, post-reflexion needs to begin with 
the very first step of a phenomenological study and 
continue with every process. I want to emphasize that 
this is an inquiry which is grounded upon the under-
standing of the human being as a being of truth and 
justice, and also a philosophical practice which cultivates 
flesh to better sense other people and communities. 
The responsibility and care for others does not mean a 
reflection on what an individual may have done to others 
on a daily basis. While this is also a valuable reflection, 
what is implied methodologically is maintaining a 
critical perspective and practice toward oneself and 
society, considering others and other communities, and 
examining intentional relationships and responsibilities 
from the renewed definition of a philosophical attitude. 
This practice not only helps a researcher to understand 
her/his intentional relationships as an ethical subject, 
but also allows scope for a researcher to make social 
changes in direct and indirect ways. 
 
In terms of a literature review and theoretical frame-
work, post-intentional phenomenology encourages a 
researcher to partially review literature and think with 
theory rather than proceeding from than a heavy review 
of literature and tuning his/her viewpoint and analysis 
to theories s/he draws on. Its benefit is that we can 
just follow “lines of flight” in how they move and take 
different shapes, given that theories in this approach do 
not play a role as a border or a framework which defines 
and/or limits the possibility of an inquiry in a post-
intentional phenomenology. However, the intercultural 
consideration of phenomenology informs us that the 
field of philosophy is predominantly Eurocentric; so, as 
theories and ideas are rooted in these philosophies, we 
have to pay attention to how the “lines of flight”, which 
take off and lead us to the new space, are intentionally 
related to dominant and oppressive power structures. For 
instance, we can distance ourselves from immersion in 
the Europeanized/Westernized intellectual world by 
thinking with non-European/Western philosophies, ideas 
and theories. We also have to strive to create a space in 
which different forms of wisdom are valued the same as 
intellectualized and theorized ideas. These attempts can 
be used in the literature review process by including 
non-Eurocentric theories or challenging the dominant 
narratives in the world, such as post-colonial studies and 
the notion of cultural hybridity. Also, in the stage of 
exploration of a phenomenon, we can think with various 
forms of knowledge and wisdoms rooted in a variety of 
different cultures and thinkers. 
 
The five-component approach encourages phenomeno-
logists to be aware of their intentional relationships in 
the societal dimension; this becomes more complicated 
and more deeply demanding by the addition of the inter-
cultural consideration, especially due to its implication 
of lifeworld as plural. This acknowledgement informs 
two significant questions to consider: (1) How can this 
approach be restated and rearticulated with the idea of 
plural lifeworld? and (2) How can a researcher capture 
and understand a phenomenon if each lifeworld is 
particular and connected and manifested in a specific 
form? The first question asks how this method needs 
to be re-imagined considering both researchers’ and 
individual participants’ positionality and context, and 
also the intentional relationships among them. The 
second question raises awareness of the impossibility of 
an individual scholar capturing more than partial under-
standing of a phenomenon, especially if a phenomenon 
has intercultural intentional relationships, and asks how 
post-intentional phenomenology would embrace and take 
up this challenge. 
 
This paper represents just the start of the discussion of 
intercultural post-intentional phenomenology, and so 
further work should be continued by phenomenological 
researchers as they pursue their research. As Vagle’s 
(2018) reading of “lines of flight” tells us, we will 
have to see how the points addressed in this paper 
take off and assume shape in various ways. It is also 
important to be open to accepting when such inquiry 
leads a researcher to undo some or many arguments 
made here. For this reason, continuing a phenomeno-
logical inquiry is making a commitment to a brave 
struggle for truth and justice. 
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